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Abstract 
The ratio of money demand to GDP may increase with portfolio demand, monetization, 
and a deeper division of labor. Using a cross-section approach to money demand for 
126 countries this study shows that the share of agriculture, life expectancy at birth, 
openness, and trust in the banking system capture a good deal of these influences. Once 
these variables are included, GNP per head negatively impacts on the ratio of money 
demand to GDP, which is in line with the standard result by Tobin and Baumol. 
 
JEL: E41, C21 
1. Introduction 
The positive impact of income on the ratio of money demand to GDP is standard to empirical 
investigations – and so is its contradiction with theory. Since Baumol, Tobin and Allais one 
expects the ratio of money demand to GDP to decrease with income, [Baumol and Tobin 
1989]. The higher the transaction volume (proxied by income) the more one will endeavor to 
economize on monetary holdings. That this relationship is not given empirical recognition is 
precarious. This inconsistency has been commonly related to structural shifts arising in the 
long run. Our theoretical predictions would be valid only for short-term cyclical fluctuations. 
Friedman [1959] pioneered the assumption of a long-term upward trend of money demand 
(that is, a downward secular trend of income velocity). If this assumption holds, one should be 
able to identify the causes of structural changes and attempt to provide quantitative estimates. 
This study shows reproduces the standard empirical finding of a positive association between 
income and the ratio of money demand to GDP. But it shows that this association can be 
traced to the correlation of income with other variables: The share of agriculture, life expec-
tancy at birth, openness, and trust in the banking system. Including these variables reconciles 
theory with evidence: A negative impact of income on money demand (relative to GDP) is 
obtained. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical arguments for a long-
term trend to increasing money demand (relative to GDP). Some basic regressions are carried 
out in Annex 2. These are intended to determine the appropriate functional form of GNP per 
head and the interest rate. These regressions are carried out for a cross section of 126 coun-
tries and bring about the standard results of a negative impact of the interest rate (or a positive 
impact of the reciprocal term) and a positive impact of income on the ratio of money demand 
                                                 
1 The author holds a chair position in economic theory at the University of Passau, Innstrasse 27, 
94030 Passau, Germany, Tel: 49-851-5092551, jlambsd@uni-passau.de. The author is grateful to J. 
Breitung, H.-J. Jarchow, H. Möller, M Schinke and C. Schinke for providing helpful comments and to 
the participants of a workshop at the Institute for Statistics and Econometrics, Göttingen, Germany, 







to GDP. These results are not crucial to this study and are rendered to the appendix accord-
ingly. Section 3 introduces some of the crucial variables mentioned. These are added to the 
regressions and explanations are provided how they contribute to explaining money demand. 
Section 4 extends the investigation by assessing also portfolio demand for money and includ-
ing inequality in the analysis. Section 5 concludes. Annex 1 explains how the data was re-
trieved and compiled. Annex 3 reports the list of countries contributing to the regressions and 
annex 4 reports the crucial correlations. 
2. Long-Term Determinants of Money Demand 
One reason for a secular upward trend of money demand may relate to monetization. Mone-
tization is defined as the fraction of total income received in the form of money, [Melitz and 
Correa 1970: 13; Jones 1976; Niehans 1971]. If, on the other hand, barter trade characterizes 
societies, exchange can be carried out without making use of money. The higher is the share 
of transactions based on money, the higher will be the ratio of money demand to the total 
transaction volume. As societies become richer, there is likely to be a tendency to depart from 
barter. This could explain a secular trend where growing economies experience an increasing 
money demand. Another impact on monetization may result if societies are characterized by a 
widespread use of reciprocal exchange. Economic actors then start to accumulate rights for 
reciprocal favors instead of piling up financial assets.
2 Reciprocity thus becomes an alterna-
tive medium of exchange, lowering the necessity to hold money. A variety of variables can be 
tested that are likely to relate to monetization. Driscoll and Lahiri [1973] and [Melitz and 
Correa 1970: 15], for example, suggest the share of the agricultural sector in national income. 
In a subsistence economy production and consumption go hand in hand. The basic exchange 
that takes place might be more of a barter type. The agricultural sector is therefore likely to go 
along with little monetization and a low money demand.
3 
Another reason for the secular upward trend emerges when incomes – even those re-
ceived in the form of money – do not perfectly correlate with the transaction volume. An in-
creasing division of labor characterizes modern societies. This characteristic of technologi-
cal progress has been dealt with more explicitly in recent models of economic growth. These 
                                                 
2 Kranton [1996] shows how the importance of reciprocity can become self-perpetuating when goods 
are only available to members of a network. 
3 Melitz and Correa [1970: 15] also test the urbanization ratio as a proxy for monetization. In accor-
dance with their results I did not find a significant impact of this variable and refrain from reporting 
the details. The level of corruption in a country may also serve as a good proxy for reciprocity. Recip-
rocity can induce bureaucrats to serve their kin or members of a network instead of being devoted to 
the public. This can be the source of corruption. Likewise, for corruption to flourish trusted relation-
ships must be established, which keep partners in the corrupt relationship from acting opportunisti-
cally.  Countries  with  an  established  reciprocal  exchange  therefore  provide  ground  for  corruption, 
whereas a high level of monetization makes it difficult to strike a corrupt deal, [Lambsdorff 2002]. 
Yet, corruption did not exert a significant influence on money demand.  
Exchanging goods with the help of money may require mathematical skills, suggesting that 
monetization increases with literacy. However, also this variable was insignificant.  
Modern  capitalism  has  been  traced  to  Protestant  ethics.  One  may  assume  that  optimizing 
money demand is particularly an issue in countries with a large share of Protestants. Again, the share 







models emphasize the role of R&D in creating process innovation, allowing a deeper and thus 
more productive division of labor. I follow Grossman and Helpman [1991, ch. 3] and assume 
a constant returns to scale CES production function where A intermediate products x(j) are 
combined to produce the output c: 
1 A
0 c x(j) dj ,   (0,1)
α
α α ￿ ￿ = ∈ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The share LX of the total labor force L is used for production. The rest is employed for R&D. 
The intermediate products are produced only with labor input. Assuming input for intermedi-
ate products to be equal to output (x(j)) and the labor force to be divided equally for the pro-
duction of the A intermediate goods, we obtain: x(j)=LX/A. Inserting this brings about output, 
c, in relation to the amount of intermediate products that are employed in the production and 
the productive labor force: 
(1 )
X c A L
α α − = . 
Thus, production increases with the labor force and the amount of intermediate products A. 
This latter term depicts the positive (but less than proportional) impact of the division of labor 
on production. Endogenous growth can now result when the rest of the labor force, LA=A-LX, 
is employed in R&D, and when there are positive spillover-effects such that knowledge in-
creases proportional to A. This suggests that A increases constantly over time. Employing this 
model for our purposes, it is straightforward to observe that the transaction volume in the fac-
tor market is depicted by ALX. As a result, increases in A proportionately increase the transac-
tion volume but bring about a less than proportional increase of output. Technological pro-
gress, as depicted by this model, will therefore increase the ratio of money demand to GDP, 
forcing the aforementioned secular trend.
4  
The extent of technical know-how with regard to process innovation is difficult to 
quantify, particularly for a cross-section of countries. I suggest that life expectancy at birth 
captures a good deal of this variable.
5 The best form of storing knowledge might be human 
brain. In the case of learning-by-doing one cannot store knowledge elsewhere. Societies with 
a higher life expectancy would then provide a more economic usage (that is, a lower deprecia-
tion rate) of this knowledge. I will therefore include life expectancy at birth as an explanatory 
variable. Specialized knowledge that is necessary for process innovation may also be vulner-
able to a holdup – an argument that is standard to the New Institutional Economics. Long and 
repeated exchange between firms and the producers of intermediate inputs can help to estab-
lish reputation effects or contain opportunism with the help of repetition. Higher life expec-
tancy allows the exchange to become more durable, letting repetition become more likely and 
investments into specialized knowledge less likely to be exploited by opportunism.
6 
                                                 
4 In line with this argument, for the last decades world trade grew substantially, indicating a worldwide 
trend to an increasing division of labor. At the same time world GDP grew too, yet at a slower pace. 
Thus, the ratio of (cross-border) exchange to output increased. 
5 That the aging process can have an impact on money demand has been recently given recognition, 
[Remsperger 2001]. 
6 Other indicators of human capital instead of life expectancy at birth at may be considered for inclu-
sion, for example school enrollment rates. These depict investments into human capital, but they refer 







Countries that are well integrated into the world economy are also likely to be charac-
terized by a deeper division of labor. If countries are strong in exchanging intermediary goods 
with other countries, they are embedded in a global division of labor. Such countries will have 
a high degree of openness (the ratio of export plus import to GDP), a variable that will be 
included in the regressions.
7  
Portfolio demand for money, finally, may overshadow transaction demand. Möller 
and Jarchow [1996] argue that the existence of portfolio demand is the reason for a decreasing 
secular trend and that its incorporation reconciles theory with evidence. They argue for the 
case of Germany that transaction demand for money increases at a lower pace than GDP, in 
line with theory. Money is also held for portfolio considerations and the increasing wealth 
accounts for an additional increase in money demand. It is this effect that they hold responsi-
ble for the secular trend. In regressions that do not control for wealth, the impact of income 
(which correlates with wealth) will therefore be biased, misrepresenting our theory. Whether 
the coefficient is biased upward or downward, however, depends on whether the ratio of 
wealth to GDP increases or decreases over time. A neoclassical growth model commonly 
suggests that the ratio of capital to GDP remains constant because in a steady-state both vari-
ables equally grow with population and with technological progress.  
Yet, one reason for wealth increasing relative to GDP arises with the aging of society. 
Following a life-cycle hypothesis of consumption, the savings needed after retirement in-
crease with life expectancy. This changes the ratio between wealth and income and increases 
money demand relative to GDP due to increased portfolio demand.  
Holding money may also be preferred to other forms of financial capital. A crucial 
impact can result from an efficient and trusted banking system. Demand, time, and savings 
deposits, for example, are likely to increase with the development of honest banks and will 
remain poor if no trusted banking system is in place. Once these deposits are secure, money 
becomes attractive relative to holding other assets. 
Yet, there is hardly convincing and sufficient data on trust in banks available for a 
cross-section of countries. What might serve as a proxy for our purpose is the ratio of cur-
rency to the total money demand, [Hanson and Vogel 1973: 366]. An underdeveloped bank-
ing system suggests that money must be held in the form of currency. To the contrary, less 
currency is needed if money can be held in banking accounts. To the extent that people trust 
banks they will substitute currency for deposits, [Claque et al. 1999: 188]. At the same time 
they are more likely to hold deposits instead of other non-monetary financial assets. For ex-
ample, savings deposits become the more attractive as compared to stocks the more people 
                                                                                                                                                          
tion is acquired on the job, they do not well depict this type of knowledge. Assessments of “years in 
school” were insignificant in the regressions. 
7 This measure of openness is somewhat distorted by a country's population, with larger countries be-
ing characterized by a lower openness. The larger a country, the more of its trade is domestic and not 
with foreign countries. For example, the total EU's openness may not surpass that of the USA, but the 
values for each of its member countries surely do. This means that trade within the EU is included in 
the statistics while trade between Texas and California is not. This distortion can be corrected by in-
cluding also population into the regression. Population may also impact on currency substitution. The 
more likely it is that a randomly selected trading partner uses the same currency, the less interest peo-
ple have in holding foreign currencies. Incorporating population into the regressions brought about 







trust the banking system. This suggests that a low ratio of currency to money is likely to go 
along with an overall higher money demand.
8 The ratio of currency to money will also have 
an impact on money supply. Private banks can increase lending and deposits when little cur-
rency is demanded from their clients. Increased money supply lowers interest rates and thus 
also increases money demand. However, this argument alongside with the recognition that 
money supply might be positively affected by the interest rate, suggests than the interest rate 
might be endogenous to the model – requiring adequate subsequent statistical treatment of 
this variable.  
3. Empirical Evidence 
Time series analysis is the standard approach to investigating money demand. There exists 
only scattered evidence on money demand in a cross-section analysis. Noteworthy but dated 
exceptions are Doblin [1951], Ezekiel and Adekunle [1969], Melitz and Correa [1970] with a 
reply by Wallich [1971] and Lothian [1976]. A more recent one, which, unfortunately, disre-
gards important explanatory variables, is provided by Sell [1997]. In a related investigation, 
Lucas [1996: 665] correlates inflation and monetary growth for a cross-section of countries.
9 
A cross-section approach can enrich our understanding of the explanatory variables 
because it allows for the inclusion of variables that show little variation over time or that are 
even unavailable as time series. It therefore makes sense to validate results from time series 
analysis with those from cross-sections, particularly with regard to the long run forces govern-
ing the demand for money, [Wallich 1971, Lucas 1996: 665]. 
Regressing the ratio of money demand to GDP on GNP per head and the interest rate 
brings about the standard results, as shown in table 1, regression 1. This regression repeats the 
results from regression 5, table A2, annex 2. While GNP per head increases money demand 
relative to GDP (in contrast to the standard model by Baumol and Tobin), the interest rate 
lowers it. Instead of the simple (logarithm) of the interest rate, its reciprocal term has been 
used which subsequently exhibits a positive impact. Details on the choice of the functional 
form are provided in annex 2. Introducing the four aforementioned variables brings about 
significant results. For all four variables I obtain the expected impact at a high significance 
level. An increase in agriculture from 10 to 20 percent reduces money demand by 18 percent. 
An increase of life expectancy by one year increases money demand by 1.9 percent.  A dou-
bling of the ratio of currency to money reduces money demand by 26 percent. Increasing 
openness by 10 percentage points increases money demand by 2 percent. Once including the 
share of agriculture or life expectancy the impact of GNP per head falls to insignificance. The 
share of agriculture and life expectancy thus outperform income as a cause of the secular 
trend. If all variables are included simultaneously, as in regression 6, table 3, GNP per head 
enters even with a significant negative coefficient.  
The results are checked in regression 6 by including regional dummies. This is to 
make sure that the results are of global validity and not driven by regional peculiarities. Yet, 
                                                 
8 Melitz and Correa [1970: 13-4] also include the ratio of currency to money as an explanatory vari-
able. They provide an additional argument for its likely impact. Because currency holdings entail sub-
stantially higher risks than demand deposits people will more strenuously try to economize on money.  
9 Panel-data, certainly, combine time-series and cross-section data to a richer investigation of money 







these variables are largely insignificant. The various regressions have also been tested for 
linearity. Running a White-heteroskedasticity test provides no evidence for rejecting the sim-
ple linear form employed. As shown in regression 7, including a squared term for GNP per 
head did not affect the significance of the four variables. The impact of the four variables is 
therefore not related to the idea that an inappropriate functional form of GNP per head was 
employed.  Altogether,  the  share  of  agriculture,  life  expectancy,  the  ratio  of  currency  to 
money, and openness are important variables, which deserve recognition for the explanation 
of money demand.  
 
The interest rate and money demand interact in a more complex way when considering also 
money supply effects. The interest rate may not be exogenous to money demand but balance 
Table 1: OLS 
Dependent variable: (Logarithm of) the Ratio of M2  
(Money + Quasi Money) to GDP 
Independent variables  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1.33  2.77  0.99  2.61  1.35  2.95  3.43  3.20  Constant 
(6.3)
 *)  (7.7)  (4.1)  (4.8)  (6.5)  (5.9)  (6.8)  (1.9) 
0.194  0.032  0.057  0.110  0.189  -0.102  -0.122  -0.167  GNP per head (log.) 
(7.3)  (0.7)  (1.6)  (2.7)  (7.2)  (-2.3)  (-2.6)  (-0.4) 
              0.004  GNP per head (log.), 
squared                (0.2) 
2.34  2.51  2.65  2.56  2.04  2.66  2.55  2.62  1/log(Lending Rate), 
extended  (4.8)  (5.3)  (5.7)  (5.2)  (3.9)  (6.0)  (5.2)  (5.1) 
  -1.80        -0.92  -0.99  -0.96  Share of Agriculture  
  (-4.1)        (-1.9)  (-2.0)  (-1.7) 
    0.019      0.018  0.015  0.018  Life Expectancy 
    (4.4)       (4.9)  (3.4)  (5.1) 
      -0.26    -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  Ratio of Currency to 
Money (log.)        (-2.5)    (-2.5)  (-2.4)  (-2.5) 
        0.20  0.13  0.13  0.13  Openness 
        (2.4)  (1.8)  (1.7)  (1.8) 
            0.18    Middle East, Dummy 
            (1.3)   
            -0.19    Africa, Dummy 
            (-1.7)   
            -0.12    Latin America and 
Caribbean, Dummy              (-1.3)   
Obs.  126  126  126  125  126  125  125  125 
Adj. R
2  0.47  0.53  0.54  0.50  0.50  0.62  0.64  0.62 
JB
+)  2.5  5.9  7.7  7.2  1.2  5.5  2.9  5.7 
*) All t-statistics (given in parenthesis) are White-corrected to adjust for heteroskedasticity. 
+) The Jarque-Bera measures whether a series is normally distributed by considering its skewness and 







money demand and supply, where banks increase their lending and the money supply multi-
plier in response to higher interest rates. Testing the relevance of this effect for our regres-
sions requires an instrument that well correlates with the interest rate but not with the error 
term of the model. The (logarithm of the) inflation rate well serves this purpose. It affects 
money demand largely via its impact on (and strong correlation with) the nominal interest 
rate. But increased inflation does not raise the money supply, because banks will only in-
crease lending in response to a higher real interest rate. Using this instrument I conduct a 
Hausman two-step test of exogeneity [Hausman 1978; see also Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991: 
303-5]. In the first stage, the interest rate is regressed on all independent variables of the 
model and the instrument, but not the dependent variable of the model, the ratio of money to 
GDP. In a second stage, the estimated residuals from the first stage are included as an ex-
planatory variable in the model. If the residual variable is statistically significant in the second 
stage, even when controlling for the interest rate (the presumed exogenous variable), then the 
interest rate is in fact endogenous. Results from the second stage revealed that the residual 
variable failed in achieving significance. I conclude that the interest rate is exogenous to the 
model. Our concern with money supply and the endogeneity of the interest rate seem to be 
immaterial for data that relate to a cross-section of countries. 
A more fine-tuned approach incorporates also interaction terms, in particular those be-
tween GNP per head and the four newly introduced variables. This would signal a more com-
plex interaction of these variables with GNP per head and money demand. Only one interac-
tion term, life expectancy times GNP per head, showed a significant positive impact once 
omitting life expectancy itself from the regression. If a low GDP goes along with high life 
expectancy this might by indicative for an aging generation that lives at the expense of future 
generations. In this case, low savings rates are likely to go along with lower wealth and little 
money demand. Since this regression did not increase the R
2 it is not reported and I will con-
tinue with the simple explanatory variables in subsequent regressions. 
3. Portfolio Demand and Inequality 
As suggested in section 2, wealth as determined by the stock of savings should significantly 
impact on money demand. Some countries may have large money demand because wealth is 
large in proportion to GDP. A crucial variable could therefore be the stock of savings relative 
to GNP, as determined in Annex 1. Regression results are shown in table 2. 
  Regression 1 repeats the approach of regression 6, table 1. But the observations are 
restricted to countries where data on the ratio of savings to GNP was available so as to allow a 
comparison to the subsequent regressions. The share of agriculture and openness become in-
significant. This may result from the smaller coverage; particularly some countries with a 
large share of agriculture are now missing. As shown in regression 2, the ratio of savings to 
GNP enters significantly with an expected positive coefficient. This result was also obtained 
when introducing regional dummies, as in regression 3, table 2.
10 The Jarque-Bera is now on 
an acceptable level.
11  
                                                 
10 In contrast to table 3, these are now significant. This results from two countries. Oman has a very 
low money demand, but it is omitted in the smaller sample now relevant. Once omitted, other Middle 
Eastern countries exhibit money demand above average. Suriname, likewise, has a surprisingly high 







The  impact 
of  life  expectancy 
hardly  changes 
when controlling for 
the  ratio  of  savings 
to  GNP.  Hence,  in-
creased  savings  go-
ing  along  with 
higher  portfolio  de-
mand  are  not  the 
only  channel  by 
which  life  expec-
tancy  impacts  on 
money demand.  
One  further 
explanatory variable 
is  equality.  Money 
demand  is  likely  to 
increase with equal-
ity  because,  in  line 
with  the  standard 
model  by  Baumol 
and  Tobin,  the  rich 
economize  more  on 
their monetary hold-
ings.  I  test  this  by 
including  the  Gini-
coefficient  for  in-
come  inequality. 
Indeed,  as  revealed 
in  regression  4,  it 
enters  significantly 
with a negative sign.  
This impact, however, is difficult to separate from the regional dummies. Once these 
are introduced, as in regression 5, the Gini-coefficient falls to insignificance. This raises the 
question whether this coefficient contributes to explaining money demand or whether it corre-
lates with regional peculiarities, causing a spurious correlation with money demand. It is be-
yond the scope of this paper to answer this question, because the Gini-coefficient was merely 
                                                                                                                                                          
below average. It is beyond the purpose of this study to provide more detailed regional analyses. It 
suffices for our purpose that the various regional dummies did not considerably change the coeffi-
cients obtained so far. 
11 Malta is one country with an exceptionally high money demand. Excluding Malta considerably low-
ers the Jarque-Bera (its value in regression 3 would drop to 1.6) without further affecting the regres-
sion results. This provides some confidence that the results are robust, even when a normal distribu-
tion is not perfectly obtained. 
Table 2: OLS 
Dependent variable: (Logarithm of) the Ratio of M2  
(Money + Quasi Money) to GDP 
Independent variables  1  2  3  4  5 
2.85  2.58  3.39  4.07  3.75  Constant 
(5.4)  (5.0)  (7.1)  (5.7)  (5.2) 
-0.067  -0.069  -0.112  -0.087  -0.090  GNP per head (log.) 
(-1.5)  (-1.6)  (-2.4)  (-1.7)  (-1.9) 
2.83  2.72  2.36  1.89  1.72  1/log(Lending Rate), 
extended  (6.7)  (6.3)  (4.9)  (3.9)  (3.3) 
-0.64  -0.35  -0.71  -0.47  -0.88  Share of Agriculture  
(-1.1)  (-0.6)  (-1.3)  (-0.8)  (-1.5) 
0.015  0.015  0.012  0.010  0.011  Life Expectancy 
(3.7)  (3.9)  (2.6)  (2.5)  (2.2) 
-0.25  -0.22  -0.23  -0.31  -0.23  Ratio of Currency to 
Money (log.)  (-2.1)  (-2.0)  (-2.0)  (-2.9)  (-2.4) 
0.13  0.11  0.11  0.09  0.07  Openness 
(1.8)  (1.7)  (1.6)  (1.9)  (1.5) 
  0.27  0.22  0.26  0.19  Ratio of Savings to 
GNP (log.)    (2.6)  (2.2)  (2.3)  (1.6) 
      -0.012  -0.004  Gini-Inequality 
      (-2.5)  (-0.8) 
    0.26    0.40  Middle East, Dummy 
    (2.0)    (3.1) 
    -0.21    -0.10  Africa, Dummy 
    (-2.0)    (-1.1) 
    -0.20    -0.23  Latin America and 
Caribbean, Dummy      (-2.2)    (-2.1) 
Obs.  94  94  94  80  80 
Adj. R
2  0.62  0.64  0.69  0.71  0.76 







introduced as a control variable, making sure that no potential explanatory variable has been 
missed. 
In sum, life expectancy and the ratio of currency to money remain significant and sur-
vive controlling for wealth and inequality. Openness and particularly the share of agriculture 
turned out to be less significant. This lower significance, however, seems to relate more to a 
sample selection issue because many countries with high shares of agriculture are now omit-
ted in the smaller sample. Although the results are not throughout significant in table 2, the 
more representative sample of countries used in table 1 provides an argument in favor of their 
explanatory power. 
4. Conclusion 
Using a cross-section approach to money demand for 126 countries corroborates some stan-
dard findings from time series analysis. In standard regressions that disregard a broader set of 
explanatory variables income exerts a positive impact on the ratio of money to GDP, that is, a 
negative impact on income velocity. High interest rates decrease money demand. But this 
study argues that it is not income per se that causes the secular trend but rather closely corre-
lating variables. The share of agriculture, life expectancy at birth, openness, and trust in banks 
outperform income as a cause of the secular trend. Once included, income negatively impacts 
on money demand relative to GDP, which is in line with theoretical considerations. 
Life expectancy is likely to impact on money demand via its correlation with accumu-
lated savings and with inequality. However, life expectancy remains significant even when 
controlling for these variables. This suggests the existence of furthers links between life ex-
pectancy and money demand. A plausible conjecture relates to the division of labor. In case of 
an increasing division of labor, the transaction volume increases more than GDP, requiring 
more liquidity in relation to GDP. A higher life expectancy may facilitate hierarchical rela-
tionships within firms and organizations, because these can be based on the authority of eld-
ers. The best form of storing organizational knowledge might be human brain. Societies with 
a higher life expectancy would then provide a more economic usage (that is, a lower deprecia-
tion rate) of this knowledge, which, in turn, allows a deeper division of labor. In contrast, 
where organizational knowledge is scarce or expensive, societies cannot develop a complex 
division of labor. 
  The results provide direction to monetary policy. Central banks should depart from 
assuming a simple secular trend of an ever-increasing money demand, respectively, a decreas-
ing income velocity. Instead, they should address in how far the variables identified here 
could be held responsible for changes in income velocity.  
Annex 1: Description of Data 
The data used are largely from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, December 2000. 
The data obtained were Money (Series Code 34...ZF; for some European Countries I aggre-
gated 34A.NZF and 34B.NZF), Quasi Money (35…ZF), Currency Outside Banks (14A..ZF), 
Deposit Rate (60L..ZF), Lending Rate (60P..ZF), nominal GDP (99B..ZF or 99A.*ZF), real 
GDP (99BVPZF), and Consumer Prices (64…ZF). The data range from 1974 to 2000. Be-
cause the Bretton Woods system ended in 1973, this is a common period for investigations of 







period. I required 10 annual observations to be available at least for a country to be included. 
From these data I determined the rate of inflation (based on consumer prices), growth of GDP 
(based on the level of real GDP), the ratio of a broad monetary aggregates (money plus quasi 
money) to GDP, and the ratio of currency to money (the ratio of currency outside banks to 
money plus quasi money).  
  Determining the average interest rates and inflation rates across years by a simple 
arithmetic mean would be inappropriate because years with hyperinflation would enter exces-
sively. The geometric mean is superior because it reflects the average devaluation of money 
due to inflation, and the average yield with regard to interest bearing investments. In the case 
of Argentina, for example, a simple arithmetic mean would yield large values because the 
years of hyperinflation, 1989 and 1990, excessively dominate the calculation. For all other 
variables a simple arithmetic average appeared appropriate, because the data is rather evenly 
distributed with no outliers as in the case of inflation and interest rates. 
Data on openness are from the World Penn Tables and reflect average values between 
1974 and 1992. Data on the share of Protestants and GNP per head are from LaPorta et al. 
[1999]. The share of agriculture as percent of GDP, the share of literates, and life expectancy 
at birth are taken from the CIA Factbook 2000. The share of urban population in 2000 is de-
termined by the United Nation's Statistics Division. The 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index is 
from Transparency International. Inequality in income is measured by the Gini-coefficient. 
The data are from the World Development Indicators 2002 and were compiled largely be-
tween 1991 and 1998. Some missing countries have been substituted by assessments from 
Deininger and Squire (1996).
12 
  A country’s savings stock was determined first by using gross national savings data 
from the World Savings Data Base, a project by the World Bank.
13 I determine the average 
over the years 1974-1995. More recent data was not available. From this I determine the ratio 
of the savings stock to GNP by a perpetual inventory method, assuming an annual deprecia-
tion rate of 7 percent.
14 This is done here by computing a truncated savings stock (S’1995), 
resulting from the gross savings between 1974 and 1995. To this truncated stock I add the 
savings stock from 1973: S1995=S’1995 + (1,07)
-22 S1973. This old stock (S1973) is determined by 
introducing the assumption that the ratio of accumulated savings to GDP remains constant 
over time.
15 The old savings stock is then given by S1973=
 GNP1973
.S1995/GNP1995. Inserting 











                                                 
12 The authors provide updated data at the following address:  
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm 
13 The data can be retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/savings/data.htm 
14 The value of 7 percent is considered to be a realistic approximation of the real world depreciation 
rate, see for example Benhabib and Spiegel [1994].  
15 This assumption is in line with the steady-state in neoclassical growth models but in contrast to 
ideas that wealth might increase more than GDP. But even if it does, this impact is likely to be small. 
Using the procedure presented here, the ratio of GDP to capital has also been determined for 1990. It 







This procedure was particularly helpful in adequately dealing with countries whose savings 
data was incomplete. For example, if savings data prior to 1985 was not available, I would 
add (1.07)
-11S1984 to S’1995. Since this term is larger than (1.07)
-22 S1973 lack of savings data 
does not result in a smaller assessment of the savings stock. From the resulting savings stock I 
determine a ratio of the savings stock to GDP (S1995/GDP1995).  
Annex 2: Preparatory Regressions 
There are 126 countries with data on inflation, GNP per head, and monetary aggregates. As a 
dependent  variable  I 
employ  the  ratio  of  a 
broad  monetary  ag-
gregate  (money  + 
quasi money) to GDP, 
that  is,  the  inverse  of 
income  velocity.  Re-
gression  1,  table  A1, 
reports  the  results. 
Inflation  diminishes 
money  demand  while 
GNP per head exerts a 
positive  impact  on 
money  demand.  A 
doubling  of  income 
increases  the  ratio  of 
money  demand  to 
GDP by more than 22 
percent.  This  value 
seems to be largely in 
line  with  evidence 
from time series, [Fair 
1987].  
A standard im-
pact  on  money  de-
mand can be expected 
from  interest  rates 
because these indicate 
the foregone profit from holding money vis-à-vis investing into other interest bearing assets. I 
therefore include the deposit rate and lending rate in regressions 2 and 3. As shown in regres-
sion 4, the lending rate exerts the strongest influence. It will be used henceforth.  
In order to carry out subsequent regressions for as large a coverage as possible, I de-
termine missing values of the lending rate by their forecasted value. I carry out this forecast 
by regressing the lending rate on the deposit rate (if not available on the inflation rate) and 
determine forecasted values from this regression. The correlation coefficient between infla-
tion and the interest rates is above 0.8; that between the two interest rates is close to 0.9, sug-
gesting that the forecast should be good. This extended index for the lending rate is used in 
Table A1: OLS 
Dependent variable: (Logarithm of) the Ratio of M2  
(Money + Quasi Money) to GDP 
Independent variables  1  2  3  4  5 
2.30  3.03  4.09  3.89  3.99  Constant 
(9.3)
#  (7.5)  (5.3)  (4.4)  (7.5) 
0.222  0.241  0.212  0.228  0.210  GNP per head (log.) 
(8.3)  (9.1)  (7.1)  (7.9)  (8.2) 
-0.122      -0.000    Inflation (log.) 
(-3.2)      (-0.0)   
  -0.173    0.123    Deposit Rate (log.) 
  (-4.0)    (0.9)   
    -0.272  -0.375    Lending Rate (log.) 
    (-3.1)  (-2.0)   
        -0.256  Lending Rate, (log.) 
extended 
*)          (-4.3) 
Obs.  119  115  104  96  126 
Adj. R
2  0.46  0.47  0.47  0.51  0.45 
JB 
+)  2.1  3.3  1.6  4.8  1.7 
#) All t-statistics (given in parenthesis) are White-corrected to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity. 
*) For missing values a forecast has been determined by the deposit rate 
and the inflation rate. 
+) The Jarque-Bera measures whether a series is normally distributed by 
considering its skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal dis-







regression 5. It obtains a negative impact at a high significance level. The 126 countries in-
cluded in regressions 5 are reported in Annex 1.  
 
Table A2: OLS 
Dependent variable: (Logarithm of) the Ratio of M2  



















5  6 
7.66  3.44  1.12  0.784  1.33  -1.63  Constant 
(5.1)  (4.9)  (2.9)  (1.0)  (6.3)  (-1.2) 
0.158  0.256  0.159  0.256  0.194  0.982  GNP per head (log.) 
(5.7)  (3.6)  (5.7)  (3.6)  (7.3)  (2.8) 
          -0.054  GNP per head (log.), 
squared            (-2.3) 
-0.725  -0.224          Lending Rate (log.), 
extended  (-3.6)  (-2.1)         
    3.48  2.81  2.34  2.86  1/log(Lending Rate), 
extended      (4.0)  (2.0)  (4.8)  (5.0) 
Obs.  62  64  62  64  126  126 
Adj. R
2  0.47  0.24  0.48  0.25  0.47  0.49 
JB  2.3  0.3  2.4  0.2  2.5  3.0 
 
Various tests have been carried out to find out whether the impact of the (logarithm of 
the) interest rate is linear, indicating a constant elasticity. A White heteroskedasticity test in-
dicates problems with regard to linearity. In table A2, regressions 1 and 2, the sample of 
countries is divided into those with low and those with high interest rates. In line with the idea 
of a liquidity trap, the coefficient for the interest rate is much larger for countries with low 
interest rates.
16 This suggests that alternative functional forms should be used for regressions 
with the complete sample of countries. A variety of functional forms have been tested, the 
aim being that the assumption of linearity should subsequently hold. It turned out that the in-
verse of the (logarithm of the) interest rate well serves this purpose. As shown in table A2, its 
impact is largely equal for high interest and for low interest countries. This variable will be 
                                                 
16 This result contradicts the idea that the interest rates impacts on money demand in the form of a 
semi-elasticity. Fair [1987: 473], for example, rejects the idea of a constant elasticity and argues that 
an increase of the interest rate from 5 to 6 percent should have a smaller impact (on money demand 
per head) than an increase from 50 to 60 percent. This leads him, as many others, to include the inter-
est rate in a non-logarithmic form, where the coefficient depicts a semi-elasticity. But quite to the con-
trary, our results suggest that an increase of the interest rate from 5 to 6 percent has an even greater 
impact than one from 50 to 60 percent.  
I also ran regressions with the non-logarithmic form, but the non-logarithmic interest rates 
show a highly uneven distribution with some countries being outliers. The assumption of linearity 







used from now on. I also tested the impact of an interaction term: GNP per head times the 
interest rate. Irrespective of the functional form chosen for the interest rate this turned out 
insignificant; the results are not reported here.  
An important question arising is whether also the relationship for income is linear. 
Based on data for five industrial countries for the last 100 years, Bordo and Jonung [1990] 
argue that initially income velocity drops with increasing income (the ratio of money to GDP 
increases), but that this impact is reversed as countries become richer and financial innova-
tions provide sufficient substitutes to holding money. This results in a concave curve for the 
ratio of money demand to GDP, where money demand is negatively affected by increasing 
income beyond a certain threshold.  
I run a rather simple test here by including also the quadratic term of GNP per head, 
thus testing whether a second order polynomial fits the data. As can be seen from regression 
6, table A2, the quadratic term enters significantly into the regression. The coefficients imply 
that a changing income has no impact on income velocity if countries have a (logarithm of 
the) GNP per head of 9.1.
17 The results by Bordo and Jonung [1990] are thus supported here, 
although I am applying a totally different set of data. A country such as the United States with 
a (logarithm of the) GNP per head of 9.6 is located on the decreasing side of the curve. A fur-
ther increase in GNP is likely to decrease money demand (relative to income) there. For the 
Euro area, whose member states (which entered separately into the regression) have an aver-
age (logarithm of the) GNP per head of 9.2, an increase in income should leave the income 
velocity largely unaffected. This suggests that the secular trend, at least as induced by a grow-
ing income, has come to an end in the Euro area. A regression in section 3 will test whether 
the quadratic term remains significant once introducing further explanatory variables. 
Annex 3: List of Countries 
The 126 countries included are: Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, In-
donesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, LAO Peo-
ple's Dem. Rep., Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Rep., Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo,  Tonga,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Uganda,  United  Kingdom,  United 
States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
17 This results from introducing the coefficients for GNP per head (Y) into the first derivative of the 







Annex 4: Correlations 
Correlation 
Matrix 


















M2 to GDP (log.)   1.00   0.66  -0.71   0.65  -0.61   0.28  -0.51 
GNP per head 
(log.) 
 0.66   1.00  -0.84   0.76  -0.76   0.16  -0.44 
Share of Agricul-
ture  
-0.71  -0.84   1.00  -0.73   0.77  -0.29   0.34 
Life Expectancy   0.65   0.76  -0.73   1.00  -0.51   0.08  -0.48 
Ratio of Currency 
to Money (Log. ) 
-0.61  -0.76   0.77  -0.51   1.00  -0.17   0.21 
Openness 
(Imp.+Exp)/GDP 
 0.28   0.16  -0.29   0.08  -0.17   1.00   0.04 
Gini-Inequality  -0.51  -0.44   0.34  -0.48   0.21   0.04   1.00 
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